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INVESTIGATING THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL
REALM OF BIBLICAL-THEOLOGICAL
METHODOLOGY, PART II:
CANALE ON REASON
Oliver Glanz
Amsterdam, The Netherlands

2.1 Introduction
The first article of this series focused on Dooyeweerd’s interpretation of
Reason.1 I intend to draw on Dooyeweerd’s conception for the development of
an exegetical methodology that does justice to the multiaspectual phenomena
of the text as well as to the chosen hermeneutical presuppositions. As
mentioned earlier, Dooyeweerd’s conception must be critically reflected on if
an unbiased application of his thought is to be made. In order to allow for a
critical analysis of Dooyeweerd’s thought I choose the work of the Christian
philosopher Fernando Canale. Thus this article will present (for the first time)
Canale’s analysis of Reason. The third article of this series will show how
Canale’s and Dooyeweerd’s work can be utilized in order to investigate the
ontological foundations of specific methodologies. In the fourth and final
article, I will critique Dooyeweerd’s and Canale’s conceptions and sketch my
own basic portrait of the functionality of human reason. My aim is to inspire
the reader to begin a critical and productive reflection on methodology in
general and biblical exegetical methodology in particular.
The background of Canale’s analysis of Reason2 lies in the great variety
of contradicting theological systems.3 This state, in which the contemporary
theological debate finds itself, is most problematic since it seems to hinder
mutual understanding and unity. Furthermore, the current state of theological
disagreement challenges the very foundation of Christian theology.
Consequently, Canale sees the need for an analysis of theological reason
in order to discover the root of the problem of the many contradicting
theological systems, all of which claim to be rational and reasonable.4 In his
dissertation, “A Criticism of Theological Reason,” he inquires into the general
formal structure and condition of Reason by means of a phenomenological
analysis. Besides this, he searches for a biblical interpretation of the primordial
1
Oliver Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of Biblical-Theological
Methodology, Part I: Dooyeweerd on Reason,” AUSS 47 (2009): 5-35.
2
Throughout this text Reason, Logos, and Knowledge, when used in the specific
Canalean sense, will be capitalized.

Fernando Luis Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as
Primordial Presuppositions, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series
10 (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1987), 10.
3

Ibid., 3.
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presuppositions of Reason. Both the formal structure of Reason and its
biblical interpretation on the level of primordial presuppositions allow him to
develop the possibility for theological criticism.
In my presentation of Canale’s thought, I will start with a description
of his understanding of Reason’s formal structure (1.2). Subsequently, I will
describe how Canale sees the structure of Reason at work from a biblical
perspective (1.3).5
2.2 Canale’s Structure of Reason
2.2.1 Object of Phenomenological Analysis: Reason
Reason, the object of Canale’s phenomenological analysis, is not meant in its
narrow sense as an ability that pertains to human being, a typically human
cognitive potential or characteristic. Reason goes beyond the intellectual activity
or logical thought of the cognitive subject. Therefore, it is fundamentally
different from Dooyeweerd’s understanding of theoretical thought. The
structure of Reason is not the structure of the epistemic; the interpretation
of Reason is not an epistemology. Canale uses Reason more broadly as that
which makes meaning possible. Reason, therefore, includes all processes and
structures by which meaning is constituted.6 Thus Reason is not limited to, but
includes, rational analytic thinking. Different levels, factors, and aspects may
pertain to Reason. Canale speaks of Reason as being a whole, and the processes
and frameworks it entails as being parts. This is important to understand
because when Canale talks about the hypotheticity of Reason, he does not
refer to epistemology alone, but to all levels and processes of Reason.
In A Criticism of Theological Reason, Canale uses “Logos” or “Knowledge”
as synonyms of Reason. This may be confusing, but it shows the broad sense
in which he analyzes Reason. Reason is understood hermeneutically. The
primary function of Reason, then, is to create and formulate meaning, i.e.,
to provide unity and coherence for that which surrounds us and is in us⎯to
provide unity and coherence to the variety of being (entities). In order to
make this clearer, Canale explains that Reason as Logos can be described
as that which enables the expression of “meaningful words.”7 Theo-logy,
for example, tries to express meaningful words about God. Meaning and its
expression in words cannot be separated; they belong together as aspects of
5
The main source of my presentation is Canale’s dissertation. However, his
thought on the matter of Reason did not find full expression in his dissertation.
Additionally, not all of his thinking had been published yet. For that reason not only
Canale’s publications, but also e-mail communication with him helped me to clarify
crucial elements of his thought. Accordingly, not all the sources of this presentation
will be found in the bibliography.

Canale, 45, n. 1.

6

Ibid., 20, n. 1.
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the same rational activity. According to Canale, meaning is always logical in
the broad sense of the term.8 Meaning is always a product of human Logos.
Consequently, Canale universalizes Reason to coincide with human
knowledge. However, he does not want to be misunderstood as absolutizing
Reason. The absolutization can only take place when it is made a particular
capability of human beings. Like Dooyeweerd, Canale criticizes the
absolutization of particular reason as observed in the history of philosophy
and particularly in classical and modern interpretations of reason.
The central question of phenomenological analysis, then, is how
Knowledge as Logos or Reason is possible. What is structurally demanded
in order to be able to formulate meaning? This question is central, as Reason
represents the human activity that generates meaning.9 Meaning is always
constructed meaning. Consequently, there is no meaning outside of Reason,
i.e., no meaning outside of Understanding.10 This implies that Knowledge
can hinder further understanding, as Logos/Reason is the condition for
understanding, misunderstanding, and even error. According to Canale, this
allows for the experience of meaning in something that is not understood.
This is because nonunderstanding takes place when interpretation according to
Logos is generated. What is the structure of Logos that makes the expression
of meaningful words possible? What levels, factors, and aspects are involved
in Reason in order to make Reason function?
To analyze Reason, then, means to analyze the constitution of meaning
as meaningful knowledge. In order to prevent the adoption of an ideological
starting point, Canale specifies his question in terms of formal analysis. What
is it that is structurally needed by Reason in order to construct meaning? He
believes that one can discover the structure of Reason only by means of a
phenomenological analysis that is concerned with the act of knowing.
Only a phenomenological analysis will make it possible to uncover the
given structure of Reason apart from the actual interpretation of Reason.
Thus the description of the structure of Reason is not the formulation of a
theory of Reason (which necessarily takes place in the development of any
ideology). In his phenomenological analysis, Canale seems to be constantly
aware of the danger of including any ideology as a framework for interpreting
Reason. Basically, he follows Hartmann’s phenomenological analysis.
Canale sees an urgent necessity for a structural analysis of Reason
because it is only on the basis of a good structural understanding that one
can build a theory in the full awareness of its presuppositions. Although
it is especially theoretical and scientific thinking that is the object of his
critique, nevertheless the structure of Reason can be applied to both naïve
Ibid.

8

Ibid., 10.

9

Canale refers to “Understanding” in the most general way, rather than in a
specific, concrete way.
10
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and theoretical thinking. The difference is that the structure of Reason is
made more explicit in theoretical knowing, while remaining implicit in naïve
knowing.11
2.2.2 The Structure of Reason
2.2.2.1 A General Description of Reason’s
Subject-Object Relationship
In order to create meaning, Reason needs a subject and an object. Both a
knower (subject) and a known (object) are needed. This relational structure
is a priori ontic condition for Reason. In any philosophical endeavor, the
interpreted subject-object relation is a necessary fundamental of a detailed
construction of a philosophical system. Thus the basic framework of Reason
is the subject–object relationship, and it is this relationship that is the center
of meaning. In the cognitive realm, i.e., Reason’s structure, the subject-object
relation is at work. By “cognitive realm,” Canale means the very basic setting
by which understanding is generated in both its general and specific sense.12
“At work” means that the subject and object sides need to contribute to their
relationship in order to create meaning. There are two directions because of
the two perspectives that are at work: the perspective of the object (direction:
object ⇨ subject) and the perspective of the subject (direction: subject ⇨
object). From the perspective of the object, the communication of its ontic
properties (which in biblical rationality are the lines of intelligibility, as I will
discuss below) to the subject takes place. In this perspective, the subject is
essentially receptive. From the perspective of the subject, the subject creates a
logical image/idea of the object through its interpretative activity that enables
it to grasp the object and create meaning. In this perspective, the subject is
essentially active. The active interpreting of the subject supposes a framework
by which interpretation is possible. Consequently, the contribution of the
subject to the subject-object relation is presuppositional. This means that in
order to generate meaning, the subject always contributes with some content
in the form of an interpretational framework. This content basically entails a
foundational understanding of the subject-object relation.
2.2.2.2 Reason’s Frameworks as Part of the
Subject-Object Relationship
The communication on the object’s side is characterized by its ontic properties.
The epistemic potentiality of the subject and the ontic properties of the object
need to be complementary, thus need to unite in the same Logos. This is why
the concept of the epistemic (epistemology) must unite with the concept
of the ontic (ontology). One can characterize the subject-object relation as
Canale, 27, n. 4.

11

By “general” I mean the world in its totality; by “specific” I mean any chosen
aspect of reality.
12
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communicative when the concept of the epistemic (epistemology) and the
concept of the ontic (ontology) are complementary. The presuppositional
content that the cognitive subject needs in order to make sense of the
received ontic information of the object demands some basic frameworks for
interpretation. In the phenomenological analysis of the structure of Reason,
on the most basic level one can detect three main frameworks: a concept of
reality (ontological framework); a concept of knowing, including a concept
of the functioning of cognition (epistemological framework); and a concept
of a system that provides unity and guarantees coherence (theological
framework). The formulation “epistemological framework” indicates that
Reason structurally needs a concept of the epistemic (epistemology) as a part
of its realm (framework). The “ontological framework” points to Reason’s
structural need for a concept of the ontic (ontology). The theological
framework, or “system” as Canale puts it, holds together the epistemological
and ontological framework in unity and coherence. Thus the structure of
Reason demands that the ontic, epistemic, and theos need to be interpreted in
order to make Reason function. Therefore, the ontological, epistemological, and
theological frameworks of the phenomenological structure of Reason should
not be understood as referring to an existing concept of the ontic, epistemic,
or theos, but to the structural necessity of formulating a concept of the
ontic, epistemic, and theos. Reason necessarily works by the “logicalization”
or conceptualization of the ontic, epistemic, and theos. The interrelations
between the three frameworks are “empty.” Their interpretation will bring
forth structural interrelations.
The main feature of the subject is its potentiality to become cognitively
active: to interpret and create a meaningful image of the object. In its
cognitive activity, the subject is epistemically dependent on the object. The
epistemological framework of the structure of Reason is mainly centered
in the subject’s cognitive activity. Because of this, Canale understands the
epistemological framework to be dominated by the subject. The main
feature of the object in this fundamental relationship is its transobjectivity.
Transobjectivity means two things: on the one hand, that the object exists in
ontic independence from the subject, and, on the other hand, that the object
is open in the sense that it does not hide, but communicates its properties
within the structure of Reason. Because of this, the ontological framework
in a way transcends the epistemological framework. The ontic can exist
without the subject’s logic, but the epistemological framework cannot exist
without the conceptualization of the ontic as ontological framework. This
ontological transcendence, through which all knowledge can be generated
by the cognitive activity of the subject, stems from projecting the content
of previously experienced and mentally stored subject-object relations
on the object. Thus the ontic properties that were communicated in past
subject-object relationships constitute the content of the presuppositional
contribution of the subject to the present subject-object relationship. In this
sense, transobjectivity refers to the fact that the object’s ontic properties are
materialized in the memory of the subject. Therefore, all knowledge that
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originates from the cognitive activity of the subject includes the objective
contribution of the past. Here one can see how the ontological framework,
which is dominated by the object’s side, structurally interconnects with the
epistemological framework, which is itself dominated by the subject’s side.
Reason, then, is not subjective Reason, but embraces both subject and object
in their interrelation.
Besides the ontological and epistemological, Reason’s structure entails a
third framework, the theological. To understand its function and place, I will
introduce this framework after explaining the ontological and epistemological
frameworks.
As we have seen, the basic structure of Reason needs both a subject
and an object: the subject, having epistemic potentiality, needs an object that,
having ontic potentiality, is complementary in its logic. The epistemological
and ontological frameworks need to be complementary in order to have a
relationship. Without an ontological framework, the potentiality of the subject
cannot be activated. The subject is, therefore, dependent on the ontological
framework and its complementarity.
The phenomenological analysis reveals that Reason’s frameworks are not
external to but intrinsic features of the structure of Reason.
2.2.2.3 Ontological Framework
The concept of ontic reality needs to include an understanding of how a
being (entity) relates to other beings (entities). The concept of the ontic
strives for unity and coherence among being-diversity in order to establish a
meaningful understanding of the ontic. Here Canale emphasizes the “logical”
characteristic of the ontological framework. He does not have a particular
ontology in mind, but stresses that Reason’s structure needs an interpretation
of the ontic that corresponds to a certain logic: an ontology. The term
“ontological framework” thus refers to the necessity of interpreting the ontic
and not to any specific ontology. Consequently, the ontological framework
is in need of an interpretation (a specific ontology) in order to let Reason’s
structure function. An idea of the ultimate as origin of the diversity of entitybeings is structurally needed in order to establish a meaningful concept of
the ontic (ontology). The idea of the ultimate as origin allows being to be
understood in coherence and unity. Ontology, therefore, needs a concept of
Being, the ultimate ground of being from which coherence and unity flow
(theos).13 Being as the ultimate ground of being is to be taken as that which
allows for the existence of entities, i.e., what is necessary for the existence of
being.
The ontological framework, on which the epistemological framework
depends, is itself dependent on the theological framework. One could put
it like this: the ontological framework communicates the ideas of coherence
and unity from the theological framework to the epistemological framework.
This outcome of the analysis leads Canale to the important conclusion that a
Canale, 35.

13
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criticism of Reason is in urgent need of a criticism of ontology since it is the
“center of gravity of Reason.”14
2.2.2.4 Epistemological Framework
Whereas the ontological framework is part of the ontic realm of the structure
of Reason, the epistemological framework belongs to the cognitive realm of
the structure of Reason. From the object’s side, knowledge is made possible
through Being. From the subject’s side, knowledge is made possible through
the epistemological framework.
The cognitive activity that aims to construct an image of the object
demands an interpretational framework, also referred to as “categories.” The
categories of the subject enable knowledge and the constitution of meaning.
They are the necessary concepts to enable the understanding of reality as
it appears, and are, therefore, of presuppositional character. Categories
can be understood as schemes that are needed to place the properties
communicated by the object. Without the categories of the subject, a subjectobject relationship is structurally seen to be impossible. The content of the
cognitive categories of the subject is prior to the subject-object relationship.15
This content originates from previous cognitive activity in subject-object
relationships. What the subject has received in the past from the object is
stored inside the subject as presuppositions. The ontological framework then
provides the categories for the constitution of Meaning and the definition
of objectivity.16 Presuppositions, in their broad sense, refer to all the
contents that are in the mind of the subject when the subject knows. Every
new cognitive experience is incorporated in the existing presuppositional
categories in the mind of the subject. These categories are not of logical
character only, but involve the complete diversity of experience including,
for example, sensations and social memories. In this sense, the subject
projects the past onto the present. Through the phenomenological analysis
that can uncover the three necessary and, therefore, structural frameworks
among the many contents in the cognitive activity of the subject, Meaning,
which is generated by the subject’s cognitive activity, always assumes a basic
interpretation of these three frameworks. One can see that the structure of
Reason (which embraces both subject and object) includes the interpretation
of Reason’s structure in the subject! This is crucial to understanding Canale’s
analysis: the epistemological framework of the structure of Reason includes
an interpretation of the structure of Reason. To put it differently: the global
structure of Reason includes a particular interpretation of the structure of
Reason within the subject of Reason’s subject-object relationship.

Ibid., 36.

14

Ibid., 39.

15

Ibid., 41-43.

16
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The subject makes the subject-object relationship meaningful by
applying its categories. In order to apply the three frameworks of Reason,
they need to be made complementary through a basic common logic. Thus
the same logic needs to be applied to all of the conceptualizations of the
ontic, epistemic, and theos. It is, however, not only this common logic that
characterizes all frameworks, but also the prior subject-object relationships
that are stored in the subject’s memory. Structurally, the concept of the
ontic can not be established without any background in the subject-object
relationship. Through the ontological framework, Reason finds the ground for
its systematic nature in the actual content that is given to Reason’s structure
(interpretation of the ontic). That this is the case can simply be seen in the fact
that all interpretations of the epistemological framework (epistemology) have
a formulated concept of what the “object” or “objectivity” is. These concepts
of the object are clear expressions of an interpretation of the ontological
framework that is prior to any subject-object relationship.17 In this context,
Canale says that the ontological framework is necessarily implanted in the
epistemological framework, since the former provides the latter with the basis
for the necessary (epistemological) categories.
Through the cognitive categories (three frameworks of Reason), unity
and coherence are created in the process of creating images of the objects
through the cognitive subject. This leads us to the important conclusion
that although the epistemological framework is grounded in the ontological
framework, the subject interprets the ontic. This means that the concept
of the object finds its origin in the epistemic capacity of the subject⎯any
concept is of epistemic character. Here one can easily see the circularity of
the structure of Reason: the epistemic and the ontic do not exist without
each other.18 This circularity or interdependence stems from the relational
character of Reason itself. In any analysis of Reason, one will uncover the
subject-object relation as basic presupposition. As Reason embraces both
subject and object, the origination of Knowledge cannot be located in either
the subject or the object. Knowledge has an intrinsically interdependent and
relational character.
2.2.2.5 Theological Framework
As we have seen in the discussion of the ontological framework, the particular
concept of unity and coherence is structurally rooted in the idea of the

Ibid., 42-43.

17

Canale does not formulate this clearly, but this conclusion flows naturally
from his distinction between the “ground” and “form” of the systematic nature of
Reason. The functioning of the systematic nature of Reason is determined by the
epistemological framework, while the ground of the systematic nature of Reason is
deteremined by the ontological framework.
18
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ultimate as theos.19 The concept of theos is, therefore, the ground for any
unity and coherence functioning in the subject’s framework of interpretation.20
The cognitive categories that establish unity and coherence through the
interpretative act of the subject are derived from the concept of the ontic
reality whose unity and coherence is founded in the idea of the theos. The
phenomenological analysis goes beyond ontology as the ground of cognitive
categories into the ground of ontology itself: the theos, as ultimate expression
of the ontos (being rooted in Being). Again, we see how the concept of the
ontic represents the “center of gravity of Reason.”21
What can be concluded from this analysis is that Reason’s systematic nature
shows that the constitution of meaning flows from the concept of the whole
(basic understanding of the ontic) to the concept of the part (understanding
of an object) rather than the other way around. The phenomenological
analysis of Reason reveals that the meaning of the whole is not determined
by the meaning of any single part. Rather, every part finds its own particular
meaning in relation to the meaning of the whole.22 Consequently, the cognitive
subject needs to be backed up by a basic understanding of the whole (i.e., a
worldview or cosmology) in order to establish a meaningful subject-object
relation. Such a basic worldview enables the subject to create a meaningful
subject-object relation because it can formulate a coherence and unified idea
of the object. The ground of the cosmology is found in the ultimate idea of
the origin, or theos as Being (as Dooyeweerd’s terminology would put it).23
The concept of the theos, the theological framework, ultimately guarantees
and articulates the complementarity of the subject-object relationship because
the theos is the origin of this relationship.
This dependent relationship, seen from the perspective of the theological
framework (theos-ontos-epistemic), is one of the three possible formal
directions of the circle of dependencies between the three frameworks of
the structure of Reason. Here meaning starts with a concept of the theos
(system), from which a concept of the ontic can be established, from which,
in turn, the epistemic categories can be derived.
Canale explains that “Theos” is just the theological expression of the secular
philosophical concept of “the One.” From a Christian perspective “the One” is called
“Theos,” while from a secular perspective “Theos” is called “the One.” Canale, 63, n. 1.
19

Ibid., 48-49.

20

Ibid., 36.

21

Ibid., 47.

22

“Being” is differently used in Dooyeweerd’s writing. “Being” is not understood
as a necessary characteristic that allows things to exist, but as the necessary origin that
creates the existence of things. Therefore, to Dooyeweerd “Being” is a synonym for
God.
23
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Understanding the necessary grounding function of the theological
framework of the structure of Reason, we still need to acknowledge that the
theos is the ultimate expression of the ontological framework and implies
ontological concepts. This acknowledgement is crucial to understand the second
of the three formal directions of the circle of dependencies. In this direction,
meaning starts with a concept of the ontic. Here the circle runs like this: the
cognitive categories of the epistemological framework are formally grounded in
the ontological framework, which again is formally grounded in the theological
framework, which in turn is formally grounded in the ontological framework,
since a concept of the theos implies basic ontic notions.
With this conclusion in mind, one needs to realize that even the concept
of the ontic is a concept. Conceptualization itself points to the epistemological
framework that allows the cognitive subject to start its interpretative and
conceptualizing activity. Here we see the third of the three possible formal
directions: meaning starts with a concept of the logos.
2.2.3 Beyond the Perspective of Any
of the Three Frameworks
The phenomenological analysis of the structure of Reason so far revealed that
every single framework builds upon the other two frameworks. The structure
of Reason does not give priority in the sense of an absolute starting point to
any of these frameworks. None of the frameworks is independent from each
other and, therefore, none of them can become a starting point within the
structure of Reason. Although the theological framework functions as the
ultimate ground of being, it cannot represent the ultimate starting point since
it conceals a logia and an ontos.24 The reason for the complementarity of the
three frameworks is found in the logic of the interpreting subject. The concepts
of the ontic, epistemic, and theos as onto-logy, epistemo-logy, and theo-logy
need to share in the same logic in order to be complementary. However, the
complementarity does not result from the logical interpretation of the subject
alone, but also from the structural interdependence of the three frameworks
that have been referred to as the three possible formal directions in the circle
of dependencies. Thus what makes the three frameworks interdependent is
the fact that they structurally share in a common logic.
What should be clear so far is that the very presupposition of Reason is a
subject-object relationship that establishes Knowledge. In order to understand
this relationship, an interpretation of the three frameworks of Reason is
necessary. Without such an interpretation, we cannot find understanding
or express meaningful words since outside of Reason there is no meaning.
The interpretation of the frameworks has an interdependent character: every
framework depends on the other two frameworks. Although the theological
framework formally functions as the source of coherence and unity for all
concepts by articulating the interrelation between the frameworks of Reason,

Canale, 51.

24
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it is not independent.25 This is not to say that the theos is dependent, but that
the concept of the theos is not independent since it implies a basic ontological
content while functioning as the ultimate expression of the ontological
framework. A further phenomenological analysis should, therefore, make
this basic ontological content the object of study. Because of this, Canale’s
phenomenological analysis proceeds and reveals foundational ontology as the
ultimate cognitive reference in the structure of Reason. This conclusion is
argued in the following way:
All three frameworks (epistemo-logical, theo-logical, and onto-logical)
are structurally built upon Logos. Consequently, what lies beyond the
interpretation of all three frameworks is Logos itself.26 Of what character
must the minimum content of Logos be? And where does that minimum
content come from⎯where does the logic of the Logos come from? Canale
tries to answer this question by referring to Heidegger, who argues that “-logy
hides more than just the logical in the sense of what is consistent and generally
in the nature of a statement [. . . ] In each case, the Logia is the totality of
a nexus of grounds accounted for, within which nexus the objects of the
sciences are represented in respect of their ground, that is, are conceived.” Of
importance, however, is that “Ontology, however, and theology are ‘Logies’
[sic] inasmuch as they provide the ground of beings as such and account for
them within the whole. They account for Being as the ground of beings. They
account to the Logos, and are in an essential sense in accord with the Logos, that
is they are the logic of the Logos.”27
Canale argues that the logic by which we conceptualize the ontic, epistemic,
and theos is grounded in a Logos that is basically identical to the ground of
being. This Logos functions as the minimum content of the subject’s logic. If
one wants to find out what the content of that Logos is, one needs to search
for the nexus that is present in all three frameworks. One needs to go beyond
the three frameworks of Reason’s structure by searching for that which they
share as a unity. That which goes beyond any concept is Being. Through the
theological framework, all frameworks imply a logic whose categories are
grounded in the basic interpretation of the ontic as Being, i.e., an interpretation
of that which is necessary for existence, i.e., foundational ontology. Because of their
logical character, all three frameworks imply the same foundational ontology.
Foundational ontology accounts for the complementarity of the frameworks.
25
It is important to see that in the phenomenological structure the theos cannot
be seen as the origin of the ontic. Phenomenologically, the theos needs to be seen
as the principle of articulating the ontological and epistemological framework. The
understanding of the theos as the origin of the ontic reality belongs to the “material”
side of the formal phenomenological structure of Reason. Formally, the theos
functions as an empty concept that does not require the notion of creation.

Canale, 52, n. 2.

26

Ibid., 51.

27
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Here the phenomenological analysis arrives at its most foundational point.
Being as foundational ontology is the minimum content of being, and at the
same time Being embraces all human concepts.
The meaning of Being can be found in every meaning of being, since it is
the meaning of Being that provides the ground for any meaning, coherence, and
unity.28 But “Being” is not understood as a container within which reality takes
place, but as “an overall quality shared by everything real.”29 “Being” is “not
a thing in which all other things have their being” and does not “appear or is
given to us as a ‘thing’, but co-appears with all things as a basic characteristic of
their being.”30 Being cannot be understood as origin of what is, but as adjunct to
all that exists (including theos).31 Therefore, Being does not exist “by itself nor
apart from what-is.”32 When Canale refers to Being as ground or foundation for any
interpretation of Reason, it should be understood as the necessary condition
for the generation of Meaning.33 Being should not be confused with the role
theos is playing. Being is not the origin of the ontic, but a basic adjunct for the
possibility of being. Nevertheless, one could say that Being as the primordial
presupposition has the function of the theos in the sense that coherence is
established from it.34 The difference is that the dimensionality is not the logic
by which all frameworks are interpreted, but the Logos of the logic. This
means that Logos goes beyond the theological framework that functions in the
interrelation with the other frameworks of Reason as origin of coherence and
unity. The Logos then finds expression within the concept of theos.35
One could say the concept of Being is the first and last concept on
which all other concepts are built. There is no concept that can go beyond
Ibid., 68

28

Fernando Luis Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology: Scripture Replacing
Tradition (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Lithotech, 2005), §38b.
29

Ibid., §38a.

30

Byung-Chul Han, Martin Heidegger: Eine Einführung (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag,
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the concept of Being. The phenomenological analysis, therefore, finds the
borderline between Being and the concept of Being. There is no reasoning
beyond Being, but all reasoning starts with a concept of Being. The concept
of Being functions as an unconditional whole to which all the other cognitive
categories and frameworks of Reason relate as parts. This is why there is a
necessary minimum concept of Being at work in the interpretation of being.
As present in every understanding of being, the concept of Being has an
overarching meaning. The presence of Being as concept in the human mind is
necessarily assumed in the constitution of all meanings and the interpretation
of all the presuppositional frameworks of Reason. The very nexus of all
three frameworks is to be found in foundational ontology, because the Logos
shares in all of Reason’s frameworks. When one starts to uncover the different
concepts of the foundational ontological level of the structure of Reason,
one will discover the different contents it has been given in the history of
philosophy. Canale’s overview of the primordial presuppositions that have
been adapted in history will be briefly discussed in 1.3.1 and 1.3.2.
Because the concept of Being functions as the first and all-embracing
concept by which everything else is conditioned, it reveals the primordial,
unconditional, or hypothetical character of Reason. The concept of Being,
functioning as Logos, is not conditioned by any logic, since it is the ground
for logic itself, but by a choice of the subject. In this context, Canale speaks
of the spontaneity of the subject: the freedom of the subject to choose its
primordial presuppositions that will guide the course of its thinking.36
The spontaneity of the subject is the most profound philosophical
responsibility of the human subject. Since the primordial presupposition both
affects the nexus and ground of all three frameworks of Reason’s structure
and is spontaneously chosen, we can conclude that, at its very core, Reason
is of a hypothetical character. Hypotheticity, thus, pertains to the whole of
Reason’s structure.
Consequently, Canale is correct in stating that ultimate meaning is
not grounded in knowledge in the strict sense of logical deduction, but
in a “postulate” or “faith.”37 This “postulate” or “faith” is necessary for
Reason’s functioning and therefore part of Reason’s formal structure. It
is this primordial presuppositional framework, or, differently called, “the
dimensionality of Reason” or “ground of being,” that the subject brings to
the subject-object relationship and that predominantly determines the means
and end of the process of creating an image of the object.
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So all frameworks (epistemological, theological, and ontological) find
their source in the meaning of Being. The analysis of the meaning of Being
leads us beyond metaphysics, that is beyond cosmology or worldview to the
very ground.
The discussion of the phenomenological analysis ends here.
2.2.4 Doing Philosophy
In doing philosophy, the spontaneity of the subject is not only active when
a concept of Being as primordial presupposition is to be chosen.38 Creative
philosophizing in general (e.g., interpretation of Reason’s frameworks) can only
take place due to the existence of a spontaneous subject. In its philosophical
endeavor, the spontaneous subject can choose its own direction and complexity.
The individually chosen dimensionality of Reason, however, functions as the
starting point of philosophy. Starting with the primordial presupposition,
which is the minimum knowledge that Reason needs to understand the theos,
the ontological framework can be interpreted (as happens, e.g., in traditional
metaphysics: dealing with beings as beings). After the ontological framework is
developed, the epistemological framework can be established.39
According to Canale, the phenomenological reality of the spontaneity of
the subject explains the fact that there are different possible interpretations
of the same things.
2.2.5 The Need for a Historical Analysis
In a further step of his phenomenological historical analysis, Canale shows
what different interpretations have been given to foundational ontology in
the course of the history of philosophy. Such a historical analysis is necessary
since a further phenomenological analysis will not help to uncover the material
interpretation of Being. The material content of the interpretation of Being
can be discovered only through a historical analysis.40
Time and timelessness will be uncovered as the two possible interpretations
of Reason’s dimensionality in which philosophy has thought so far.
2.3 Canale’s Interpretations of the
Structure of Reason
As the structure of Reason shows, there are two crucial decisions the
spontaneity of the subject needs to involve itself in. One concerns the actual
interpretation of Reason’s dimensionality, the other the formal direction
Ibid., 31, 57.
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of the circle of dependencies. The second choice entails three options of
perspective, i.e., ordo: the ontos-perspective, theos-perspective, or logosperspective. The theos, however, always represents the ultimate horizon of the
interpretational activity. The historical overview in this section is categorized
in terms of these two decisions.
2.3.1 Classical Timeless Dimensionality
In the following, I present Canale’s understanding of the classical interpretation
of Reason’s dimensionality. In doing so, I will abstain from evaluating his
outline, as this is beyond the scope of this paper.
2.3.1.1 Interpretation from the Viewpoint
of the Onto-theo-logical Ordo
The interpretation of Being in the early Greek philosophy of Parmenides set
the ground for all further developments in Western philosophy. The reflection
on being as imperfect and limited and the search for a theos that would provide
coherence and unity led to the idea that Being is essentially timeless. This
decision implied that perfection was defined in terms of timelessness, which
meant that perfection was not considered under the influence of change due
to time. Where time was excluded, the realm of the ideal, completeness, and
immutable source of being could be located. As being was considered temporal
and changeable, and Being timeless and unchangeable, Being could be defined
as that which does “not come into being” because of its absolute perfection.
An opposition was thus created between the timeless and temporal realms.
The distinction was able to account for the wide diversity of the experienced
temporal world, while preserving unity and coherence through the origin of all
temporal being, i.e., timeless theos-Being.
The ontologically grounded timeless definition of Being as dimensionality
of Reason was not only presented by Parmenides, but also adopted and
further developed by Plato and Aristotle. It characterized almost all of
classical Occidental philosophical thinking. Further, it exemplified an ontotheo-logical ordo. The reflection on the ontic became the starting point for
the flow of meaning: from the ontos to the theos to the logos. From the
logic of a timeless Logos, i.e., a timeless dimensionality of Reason, ontology,
theology, and epistemology are constructed.
2.3.1.2 Interpretation from the Viewpoint of
the Logical-onto-theo Ordo
The Cartesian paradigm and the influence of Kant changed the direction of
the flow of meaning by grounding the interpretation of the dimensionality of
Reason in the epistemological framework. Thus the ontological foundation of
Reason’s dimensionality was replaced by the transcendental-epistemological
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foundation. The interpretation of Reason’s ordo therefore changed, but
Being was still interpreted as timeless. Starting with Kant, philosophy began
to give Reason’s structure a different ordo, but not a different dimensionality.
Classical timeless Being was substituted by modern timeless Logos. Thus, with
the change of ordo, there was not a corresponding change of dimensionality.
The turn to the epistemological framework led to an immanent cognitive
foundation, the so-called “turn to the subject.”41 This “turn to the subject”
was the consequence of grounding the categories of the subject in the
epistemic realm rather than in the ontic.
2.3.1.3 Timeless Dimensionality and Its Consequence
for Ontology and Epistemology
In order to clearly see how a timeless dimensionality of Reason affects
the ontological and epistemological frameworks, they will be discussed
individually.
2.3.1.3.1 Ontological Framework
When Being is defined as timeless, the ontological framework consequently
conceives ultimate reality as timeless. The idea of timelessness is not to be
confused with the ideas of “having no beginning or end,” “not restricted
to a particular time or date,” or “not affected by time: ageless,” but strictly
refers to exclusion of time. Timelessness further implies that Being exists
independently from the cognitive subject.42 This means that the interpretation
of Being as timeless automatically creates a gap between being and Being,
as they do not share the same time frame. This gap, albeit in different ways,
exists in both the Platonic and Kantian line of thinking.
In the relation between Being as truth and being as doxa, the latter is
the temporal expression of timeless Being. This means that, in the world
of doxa, we do not encounter Being itself, but a phenomenon that stands in
an analogical relation to Being. The world of doxa as the world of temporal
imitation of its timeless essence relates to Being by participation in various
degrees of analogy.
Timelessness, then, is the conception that ultimate reality (God) is
essentially incompatible with time and space. In this line of thinking, reality
necessarily transcends the world of doxa and appearance, which is bound to
historical and analogical doxa-reality.43
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2.3.1.3.2 Epistemological Framework
From the viewpoint of timelessness, a chorismos is created between doxa
and truth. This chorismos is also found in the epistemological framework. It
enters cognitive activity when the obtainment of true knowledge requires
transcending the temporal and sensory world. In order to enter the world
of ideas or truth, cognitive activity needs to involve itself in a process of
abstraction that seeks to overcome the temporality of being. If reason wants
to reach into the realm of timelessness in order to come to true understanding,
it must belong to the realm of timelessness itself. This need was the ground
of the classical notion of the agens intellectus, an entity located in the timeless
soul, able to abstract the timeless essence from the temporal and sensory
world.44
The classical interpretation of Reason as belonging to the timeless realm
reveals its ignorance or unawareness of the hypothetical structure of Reason.
It is this hypothetical structure that makes the different choices in regard to
the dimensionalities of Reason and to the theos idea (having independencestatus) possible.
As discussed, in the Cartesian and Kantian paradigm the timeless
interpretation of Reason’s dimensionality was not rooted in the ontic, but
in the epistemic realm. Another difference in these traditions is that the
cognitive access to timelessness was made impossible by making the agens
intellectus temporal. Thus the agens intellectus did not enter the world of truth
and ideas, or the things in itself, but only the phenomena.
Kant’s attempt to ground Reason’s dimensionality in the epistemological
framework automatically resulted in a “turn to the subject.” In this turn,
philosophy lost the ability to acquire absolute knowledge, i.e., to reach the
thing in itself, since the dimensionality of Reason was not grounded in ultimate
reality anymore. The world of truth and ideas became inaccessible. In classical
thinking, one tried to overcome the chorismos between the timeless essence and
temporal appearance by timeless reason. In the modern paradigm, this chorismos
could not be overcome anymore, as it was not certain whether the ontic world
actually had a different dimensionality than the epistemic. The certainty of
the complementarity of the two frameworks was lost, and thus the basis for
objectivity. With this problem, the cognitive process of “abstraction” got a new
limitation. Timeless Logos no longer gained absolute knowledge of timeless
Being through abstraction, but gained objective knowledge of the temporal
world as scientific knowledge. Later philosophical attempts were made to
overcome this gap by seeking means to access the realm of Being. These
attempts did, however, fail to fundamentally criticize the whole conception of
timelessness. Canale’s reference to Jaspers is a good example.45 Jaspers thought
that certainty about the existence of Being is somehow possible through the
existential sensitivity of being: the subject is able to “hear” the transcendence
Ibid., 78.
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of the timeless realm through a “metaphysical experience.” Knowledge of
Being clearly lost its objectivity here, and timeless foundational ontology went
uncriticized.
2.3.2 Postmodern Temporal Dimensionality
According to Canale, it took centuries until the classical and modern
timeless understanding of the foundational ontic world were questioned and
criticized. Husserl, and later Heidegger, started to interpret the ontological
realm as basically temporal.46 Heidegger’s temporal interpretation of the
dimensionality of Reason provided a new definition of time. The character
of time was no longer understood from the viewpoint of the timeless, but
from the viewpoint of the temporal. This meant that time was understood
from the viewpoint of its temporality, i.e., the flux of time. In this new setting,
Being was not timeless anymore, but historical.
2.3.2.1 Ontological Framework
The consequence of the notion of temporal dimensionality was that entities
did not receive their existence through their timeless essence anymore, but
were fully temporal. Interpreting both Being and being as temporal meant to
overcome the duality between form and matter, truth and doxa. Since both
Being and being were temporal and historical, there was nothing beyond the
phenomenon anymore. The realm of being and appearance was the realm of
Being as well. In fact, doxa was Being. There was no reality beyond time. As
the gap between subject and object was overcome, the distinction between
the thing in itself and its appearance became unnecessary. What classical and
modern philosophies meant by the “thing in itself ” as ultimate reality became
temporal.
2.3.2.2 Epistemological Framework
The epistemological framework also received a new interpretation through
the temporal dimensionality of Reason. Mental categories were no longer
derived from the immanent transcendental cognitive grounding of Reason’s
dimensionality (Kant), or from the timeless transcendental ontological
grounding (classical philosophy). Instead, the Lebenswelt provided the material
for the consciousness of the subject.47 This means that the a priori categories
of the subject were derived from the historical past. The content of the
categories and the creation of a unified and coherent image of the object are
thus not determined by the participation in the timeless world of ideas, but
by the temporal epistemological flow from past to present to future. Theos
lost its timelessness. With this loss, temporal reason needed to redefine the
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theos and develop a new temporal metaphysics.48 Further, concepts such
as “objectivity” and “abstraction” needed a redefinition. Objectivity and
abstraction needed to be understood from the viewpoint of temporal logos,
which is in continuity with the Lebenswelt. Objectivity as the aim of abstraction
did not refer to transcending the sensory-temporal world anymore. The
essence of reality was not sought in the realm of timelessness, but in the realm
of the flux of time. This new location of essence led to a new understanding
of abstraction. Abstract thought would encompass less than the Lebenswelt, as
the Lebenswelt could not be reduced to a final absolute idea. Thus, because of
reduction, objectivity became less encompassing than the Lebenswelt.49
2.3.3 Biblical Temporal Dimensionality
The content of the ground of Being as the first basic ontic concept, through
which Being can be understood, is either subjectively guessed or objectively
revealed. Only when the ground of Being is revealed can the subject start to
uncover its dimensionality without depending on its own imaginative powers.
Being a biblical Christian, Canale investigates the biblical expression of the
ground of Being. On the basis of a phenomenological analysis of several biblical
passages, he shows that the Bible expresses Being. What dimensionality does
biblical Being express? Although the Bible does not systematically develop
a theory of Being and does not give an explicit interpretation to Reason’s
frameworks, the Bible as rational fact (as expressing meaningful words) must
be structurally seen to contain an interpretation of the dimensionality of
Reason. This means that one cannot discover the dimensionality of Reason
through a phenomenological analysis of the Bible’s epistemological and
ontological theory (since they do not exist), but can discover it through the
passages where the biblical writer considers Being in a naïve way. At this
point, Canale analyzes Exod 3:1-4:17 and Exod 6:2-7. The passage of Exod
3:1–4:17 utters Being prior to any expression of a theory of ontology or
epistemology. The understanding of the biblical expression of Being should
function as basis for any theorizing activity of Christians and Jews.
2.3.3.1 Biblical Interpretation of the Ground of Being
Canale’s phenomenological analysis shows that Exod 3 speaks about Being
in the present tense and connects God’s existence with an understanding
of Being. Canale shows that especially the meaning of the sound-name of
YHWH as the God of Israel reveals the dimensionality of God’s being as
grounded in an understanding of Being that is characterized by temporal
openness.
Again, I will not argue for or against Canale’s exegetical analysis here
because of the scope of this article series, but will simply present his⎯in my
opinion convincing⎯results.
See the attempt to develop a new temporal metaphysic in ibid., 141-153.
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When God appears and explains his sound-name YHWH, the Bible
depicts him as essentially a being-mission God. This being-mission character
refers to the temporal openness of God’s presence to past and future time. It
means that God is concerned with and active in the many generations of his
people, fulfilling the promises given to past generations. His being-mission
identity extends through all three time ec-stasies. Canale understands this
temporal extension (ec-stasies) as “temporal openness.” “Extension” points
to the fact that temporal Being cannot be reduced and frozen to a static reality.
Thus extension points to Being’s manifold ontic appearances that constitute
the ontological basis for cognitive activity. In order to grasp the meaning of
a subject matter, the cognitive subject must gather in “tension” the lines of
intelligibility that flow from the temporal “extension” in which its object is
found.
In Exod 3:2 and its context, the ontic presence of God springs from
the self-revelation of God. This shows that God’s presence is understood as
YHWH himself appearing in time. The biblical verbal expression shows that
there is no ontological gap between God’s being and his appearance.50 Thus
the appearance of YHWH is YHWH himself. Being is here identified with
appearance, and not with something that is behind or beyond appearance.
This connection has the character of co-appearance: God’s being necessarily
co-appears with the ground of Being. Being appears through God’s presence
and self-revelation. In this view, ontology cannot precede the study of
God because there is no reflection on Being prior to God’s ontic presence.
Regarding the interrelated frameworks of Reason, the Bible expresses a clear
theo-onto-logical order within the flow of meaning. This implies that the
ground of Being can only be interpreted when God appears or is present.
Since the God of the Bible co-appears with and expresses the ground of his
Being, his ontic presence can and should function as starting point for the
interpretation of the dimensionality of Reason.
Since the biblical passages depict God’s presence as open to all three
temporal ec-stasies (past-present-future) while it co-appears with Being, the
biblical dimensionality of Being is revealed as temporal.51
In the following section, I will briefly sketch how this understanding
of Being’s dimensionality affects the interpretation of Reason’s frameworks,
which all need to share structurally in the same temporal nexus.
2.3.3.2 Ontological Framework
The consequence of a temporal dimensionality is that being is necessarily
temporal, as it is grounded in temporal Being. Consequently, temporal
appearance can be considered real being that co-appears with Being. Meaning,
then, is essentially connected with both past and future, as it is grounded in
50
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temporal Being and the meaning of “presence” is immediately filled by the
“lines of intentionality” that come to it from its past and future extension.52
The classical problem of the chorismos and solution of the analogia entis
are overcome in biblical philosophy, inasmuch as biblical thought portrays
the phenomenon as ultimate reality. Biblical thought, however, does not
reject the analogia entis, but redefines it. In contrast to the classical timeless
dimensionality, biblical temporal dimensionality requires a continuity between
that which is given in the presence of appearance and that which is beyond
the moment of presence, i.e., the temporal extension of being in past and
future appearance. Biblical analogies thus refer to temporal extensions instead
of temporal-timeless mediations.
The material character of the being-appearance is not discovered in one
moment of present time, but in its temporal extension. The biblical text itself
refers to this dynamic character, since it reveals a clear progression in time of
the meaning of the sound-name YHWH.
2.3.3.3 Theological Framework
There seems to be a tension between the independent, unconditioned status
of theos and foundational ontology, which conditions any interpretation of
Reason’s frameworks—including the theological framework. The concept
of God as grounded in the concept of Being seems to make foundational
ontology more foundational than God. Does this relation not dissolve the
independent status of God as origin of and condition for everything, since
foundational ontology seems to condition our concept of God (theology)?
In response to this question, three important statements must be made.
First, the nature of the structure of Reason is logical, not ontical. That is, for
the existence of Reason the ontic existence of human being is required but
the operation of the structure of Reason is logical and not ontical. Second,
Being is not understood as an entity that could function as the originator of
ontic reality; it is not perceived as a container within which reality takes place,
but as a necessary adjunct to all that exists (cf. 2.2.3). Third, it is true that
foundational ontology determines theology.
The first statement indicates that it is crucial to make a distinction
between ontic and ontology on the one hand, and theos and theology on the
other. Just as ontology is not reality itself but merely a concept of it, theology
is not theos itself but just a concept of it. In any concept, logic turns an
object (e.g., ontic reality or God) into a cognitive reality. As the ontic “calls” to
be understood through an ontology, the biblical God “calls” to be understood
through a theology on the basis of his revelation. Thus the ontic being of
God is not determined by foundational ontology in the sense that the latter
“creates” God, but that the latter allows for a conception of God.
Besides this, the formal structure of Reason would not allow for an
understanding of Being as origin, as Being is not understood as a thing that
has existence but as no-thing that necessarily co-appears with reality. Thus
Ibid., 377, n. 2.
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foundational ontology has logical priority in the constitution of meaning.
Therefore, foundational ontology only describes the most general characteristic
of reality, which is merely one of the probably infinite characteristics of God.
This excludes the idea that foundational ontology, which is revealed by God,
could be independent from God.
2.3.3.4 Epistemological Framework
If Being, and thus theos, are temporal, Logos also needs to function as
temporal Logos, i.e., the very ground of the cognitive categories must be
temporal as well. This is not just logically deducible from Reason’s structure.
Exodus 6 explains that true understanding of God takes place when God’s
being is remembered, experienced, and hoped for in the three temporal ecstasies. Canale’s analysis of Exod 3 shows that the text is concerned with who
God is. In the analysis of Exod 6, Canale shows that the text is focused on
how to know God.
The connection between the appearance and the knowledge of God
in Exod 6 reveals their essential interrelation. Appearance and knowledge
share the same ontological foundation or nexus. That all Reason’s frameworks
share the same nexus finds its biblical expression in Exod 6:3. This text first
states that ontologically God’s appearance provides the ground for man’s
knowledge of him. Then it stresses that epistemologically the meaning of
the sound-name of God makes knowledge of God’s being possible. Thus
epistemologically Reason functions in the Being-meaning of the sound-name,
i.e., in temporal extension. In the biblical understanding of the epistemological
framework, the content of the cognitive categories that create meaning in
unity and coherence is derived from past encounters with God’s appearance.53
Thus a prior understanding of (a) theos and (b) his ground of Being enables
the epistemological framework to coherently conceptualize the ontic. The
cognitive process has to proceed temporally in order to discover the meaning
of being through a gathering process of past-present-future extensions of
co-appearing Being-appearance.
The concept of temporal Logos demands a new understanding of
the process of cognitive activity. Abstraction and objectivity need a new
definition. If the ontic extension is the basis for the cognitive process, we need
to think of a process that gathers the dynamic ontic extensions of an entity
(this is the case both for naïve and scientific thinking).54 Knowledge is always
a construction that builds upon the past, is formulated in the present, and
assumes a future. Thus abstract knowledge always takes place in the future,
Ibid., 371, n. 2.
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or there where the knowledge of the future is accessible in the present time.
It is in this context that prophecy and fulfillment play an important role in
the redefinition of abstract knowledge. Whereas the classical understanding
of knowledge involves a process of abstraction that eliminates the historical
and temporal world in order to enter the timeless realm of ideas, the biblical
temporal understanding of knowledge involves a process of cognitive
extension-tension, i.e., gathering the lines of intelligibility (data) generated by
the temporally extended subject matter. Here abstract knowledge is not what
is timeless, but what is gathered from the temporal lines of a subject matter
into a logical concept. Abstraction as the concept of the totality of theos’s
ontic extensions in logical gathering also includes what has not yet become
present or past but is still part of the future ec-stasy of the subject matter.
Abstract words are words of promise or prophecy that are generated by the
subject matter (e.g., God) and come from its future extension. In this sense,
the cognitive process always strives for what is not yet historical, i.e., abstract,
not because it is timeless, but because the future temporal ec-stasy needs to
become historical in order to arrive at true knowledge. In biblical rationality,
abstraction in and of itself is not the end or aim of thinking, but a necessity to
come to a full understanding of a subject matter. In this sense, the “abstract”
divine predictions are striving toward their historical fulfillment. Whereas in
classical thinking that which is abstract cannot become temporal but can only
analogically find expression in the temporal world, biblical rationality expects
that which is abstract to become historical. Thus truth is decided at the
moment the abstract becomes historical, not when it becomes a-historical!
What is tensioned in the cognitive process is what is ontically extensioned. That which is ex-tensioned in the three ec-stasies of time and
that which can be tensioned in present time are, in Canale’s understanding
of the biblical interpretation of the epistemological framework, the lines of
intelligibility of the subject matter.55 The lines of intelligibility flow from the
temporally extended subject matter. They can deliver information about the
past (e.g., past actions) or the future (e.g., promises, prophecies) ec-stasies of
the subject matter. This means that the biblical interpretation of Reason does
not assume that the essence of a subject matter is a brute fact from which
no lines of intelligibility flow to the cognitive subject. The cognitive subject
is therefore not expected to create fully an image of the brute fact by his
own hypothetical powers. On the contrary, biblical rationality understands the
ontic presence of a subject matter as intellectually graspable, as its meaning
can be found in the subject matter’s temporal extension that generates lines
of intelligibility.
2.3.4 Summary
We have seen that classical philosophy interprets ultimate reality as timeless,
whereas the Bible considers reality to be temporal and historical. This
difference has a major impact on the interpretation of Reason’s frameworks.
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 372, n. 2; 378.
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In a timeless conception of Being, God’s manifestation is consequently of
nonhistorical quality. Both divine activity and human abstract knowledge
belong to the realm of timelessness. Therefore, God’s actions are reduced
from true temporal reality to mere cognitive awareness (the epistemological
level according to the classical paradigm).56 Biblical rationality, in contrast,
views reality as essentially temporal and historical. These crucial differences
are rooted in different understandings of God’s ultimate nature.
The meaning of YHWH gives us insight into the reasons behind two
decisions made in the biblical interpretation of Reason. First, it introduces us
to the temporal interpretation of the primordial presupposition and, second,
it reveals the theo-onto-logical ordo this interpretation is rooted in. These
two decisions of biblical rationality imply that ontology cannot precede the
study of God.
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